President Joe Biden is coming to the end of what many regard as a disastrous presidency. His departure from the White House could mark a turning point in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and in three decades of calculated Western policies that have led to Russia’s alienation and the collapse of its democratic project. But it depends on incoming President Donald Trump’s ability not to repeat the mistakes of his predecessor.

It was Russian President Vladimir Putin who decided to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but the ground for this conflict was prepared by U.S. security officials in the 1990s. At the time, Russia had just emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union, weaker and more disoriented, and its leadership, idealistic and incompetent at the time, believed that full integration with the West was inevitable.

The decision taken at the time set off a confrontation between Russia and the West that has reached its logical climax during Biden’s presidency.

The problem was never the eastward enlargement of NATO (a security treaty designed to counter the Soviet Union) and the EU itself, but rather that Russia was excluded from the process.

Crucially, this approach puts Ukraine on a path to Euro-Atlantic integration while excluding Russia – driving a rift between two countries closely linked historically, economically and interpersonally. It has also accelerated the securitization and democratic backsliding of Russia under Putin.

This outcome was never foreordained and was achieved through the tireless efforts of U.S. security officials.

One of the missed opportunities to pursue a different path was the Partnership for Peace program formally launched in 1994 by the Clinton administration. The plan aims to balance the desire of former Warsaw Pact countries to join NATO with the key goal of keeping Russia in the alliance – as a major nuclear power and a new democracy with a decidedly pro-Western government.

Russia also joined the bandwagon, but as American historian Mary Sarote writes in her book Not an Inch , this useful framework was undermined at its inception by a handful of security officials in Washington. .

She spoke specifically of the “troika of pro-NATO expansion” consisting of Daniel Fried, Alexander Forshbaugh and Richard Holbrooke, who pushed for aggressive NATO expansion despite Moscow’s protests.

Sallot also mentioned John Herbst as the author of a later report on NATO’s unofficial commitment to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, which, as she said, Shaped the U.S. policy of ignoring Russian complaints about NATO expansion all the way to its borders. decades to come.

The unreflective arrogance and triumphalism displayed by these security officials can also be seen in Biden himself, then a prominent member of Congress. in a 1997 videoHe mocked Moscow’s protests against NATO expansion, saying if Russia remained intransigent it must embrace China and Iran. He clearly thought this was a ridiculous and unrealistic scenario at the time—perhaps he believed Russia had no choice but to remain in the Western orbit. But it turned out to be exactly what he thought was a clever joke.

Biden has found a willing partner in hawkish politics toward Russia: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. It’s no coincidence that Zelensky began a U-turn in relations with Russia just as Biden took office.

Ukraine’s president was elected on a promise that he would end the growing conflict that began with Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. He met with Putin in Paris in December 2019, and the two agreed to a ceasefire in the Donbas region. Both sides were largely respectful, reducing the death toll to close to zero.

But as soon as Biden entered the White House, Zelensky ordered a crackdown on Putin’s Ukrainian ally Medvedchuk, while hyping up Ukraine’s membership of NATO, the return of Crimea, and the derailment of the Russian-German Nord Stream 2 railway. Natural Gas Pipeline Engineering.

Zelensky’s decision may have been influenced by two factors. Azerbaijan’s victory over Russian-backed Armenian forces in the fall of 2020, thanks in large part to Turkish Bayraktar drones, raised hopes of success in a high-tech war against Russia. Another factor is that polls in December 2020 showed Medvedchuk’s party ahead of Zelensky’s.

Days after Biden’s inauguration, Zelensky gave an interview to the American media outlet Axios, in which he famously asked his American counterpart: “Why has Ukraine still not joined NATO?” Later, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Ku Dmytro Kuleba published an op-ed on the same issue published by the Atlantic Council, a think tank that receives much of its funding from the U.S. government and Pentagon contractors.

Not surprisingly, some of the same figures who shaped U.S. policy toward Russia in the 1990s also encouraged the Biden administration to adopt the aggressive policies that led to the invasion.

On March 5, Fried, Vershbow, and Herbst and three others published a Report The Atlantic Council has provided a list of recommendations to the Biden administration regarding Ukraine and Russia. These boil down to putting pressure on Putin by escalating on various fronts – from proposing plans for Ukraine to join NATO to derailing Nord Stream 2 and “increasing security in the Black Sea.”

Three weeks after the article was published, Putin began deploying troops to Ukraine’s border, beginning a chilling 11-month campaign of brinksmanship. During this period, the British warship “Guardian” entered Russian-declared territorial waters off the coast of occupied Crimea in June, the United States began secretly supplying weapons to Ukraine in September, and finally the United States and Ukraine announced a strategic partnership in November relation. In the eyes of Kremlin hawks, the move amounted to a declaration of war.

Around that time, Putin began preparing in earnest for an invasion, which he eventually triggered in February 2022. The resulting war is now approaching its third anniversary.

Despite strong Western support, Ukraine has suffered heavy losses and gained nothing in its fight against Putin. The war has pushed Ukraine to the brink of collapse, causing a massive refugee crisis, economic collapse, social disintegration and a rising death toll.

If peace is achieved in Ukraine this year, it is likely to be a repeat of the failed Istanbul accords of 2022, which envisaged a neutral Austria-style Ukraine but with limits on the size of its military. Russia may insist on retaining much of the territory it gains as punishment for Ukrainian intransigence. Technically, this would constitute a defeat for Ukraine, but it would be a clear victory for the Ukrainian people and the rest of the world who have borne the brunt of this war.

It would also be a major defeat for the security class, which has been pushing for a new confrontation with Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The strategy of aggressively pursuing expansion at the expense of Russia has clearly failed. Now is the time for Western policymakers to reflect on how to turn the tide and begin the slow return to rapprochement with Moscow.

This is not to absolve Putin’s government of responsibility for crimes of aggression and war crimes committed by Russian forces. It is about removing the conditions that led to Russia’s transformation into a military dictatorship and ending a conflict that continues to underpin the existence of Putin’s regime.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Al Jazeera.